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By drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted amongst waste-pickers and 
recycling traders in the waste paper, plastic and scrap metal sectors, and engaging 
with literature from economic anthropology and history, as well as archival sources, 
this article documents changing perceptions of just price, morality and fairness in the 
Turkish recycling market. The paper suggests that multiple markets imply multiple 
prices, which are contingent and contested. When dealing with price mechanisms 
largely outside their control, actors tend to associate a fair price with the going 
market price, rather than factors such as state regulation. Approaches to morality 
and assessments of fairness become more ambigious when prices are mediated by 
actors’ own practices. These range from gift relations, to paternalism, envy and 
deception. 
 










































The Turkish recycling industry has undergone drastic changes since 2004, after the 
introduction of new waste management regulations in compliance with the 
European Union Directives for the adoption of the EU Acquis1. These changes were 
shaped by private and public actors and generated fierce contestation regarding the 
price of recyclable commodities. Contestation took the form of collective action, with 
attempts to change state policies in relation to price, playing out through moral 
discourses about what makes a fair recycling market. These conflicts provide fertile 
ground to examine the relationship between market, morality and (just) price in the 
Turkish context. This article uncovers this relationship by investigating various 
actors involved in the recycling industry who evaluate price and its determinants in 
complex and contradictory ways. The case study focuses on the capital city of 
Ankara. 
In order to situate the narrative on contestations around price in the Turkish 
recycling market, it is necessary to explain how market and price are conceptualised, 
and how this relates to debates in the literature. In the recycling sector, there is no 
single market or price. Contestations over market, morality and price change 
accordingly. Firstly, there is a globalised market, which actors experience as 
impersonal, abstract exchange. In this market the sale price of reycyclable goods 
changes according to global supply and demand, which itself fluctuates depending 
on various factors - whether or not China reduces imports of waste paper, if a 
general strike or earthquake hits Chilean copper supplies, or whether flake and fibre 
produced from recylable plastic become substitutes for cotton.1  
In the case of scrap metal, the price is specifically indexed to the London 
Metal Exchange’s global reference price for non-ferrous metals. Turkish waste-
pickers and traders are conscious of global market forces and interpret price 
fluctuations by using a market language. They consider these as factors beyond their 
power, and perceive the price they get when they sell waste as the market price. On 
any given day, there is a market price for waste-pickers who sell to warehouses, for 
warehouse owners who then sell to recycling companies, and for recycling company                                                         
1 After the EU officially announced Turkey as a candidate country, on 19 March 2001, Turkey 
approved the national programme for the adoption of the EU Acquis, which defined the 
principles, priorities and objectives of the accession partnership 
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owners who sell on to factories which use the paper, plastic and metal as raw 
materials in production. At each stage, waste obtains added value. There may be 
small price differences in this market: existing traders who want to expand their 
business, or new entrants, may offer price increases to attract waste sellers. But even 
then, there is an average market price in the first place, which traders use as a 
reference point when making a better offer. 
As willl be shown, when the state intervenes to alter the price at which waste-
pickers and traders sell, either by direct imposition or through legal regulations, 
waste-pickers and traders perceive this as unfair and defend the average market 
price as the just price. The collective repertoire of contestation around price in the 
Turkish recycling market is different from cases in which a just price is defended 
against the free market. The historical analysis of E. P. Thompson (1971) on the 
eighteenth century English crowds’ defense of paternalistic regulation of grain 
prices, James Scott’s analysis of peasants’ defense of subsistence farming, and 
contemporary riots claiming just prices against globalised markets (Auyero, 2004; 
Edelman, 2005; Siméant, 2011) do not apply in the Turkish case. The recycling market 
actors are closer to those Scholastic thinkers who viewed just price as the market 
price, as the price a good fetches in the market without anty intervention by the state 
or without any speculative behaviour by merchants (Baldwin, 1959; Monsalve, 2010). 
This does not imply that there is an ideal market price, which, once severed from all 
forms of intervention, becomes optimum. Paper factories may collude to set low 
prices low, or due to a fall in global demand the market price may drop to such a 
level to threaten waste-pickers’ survival or traders’ profit margins. But as long as 
there is no state interference, waste-pickers and traders perceive they have the 
freedom to change their buyers, alternate between export and domestic markets, 
shift to recyclable commodities with higher returns, or wait until prices rise again. 
Their assessments of a just price therefore depend on their bargaining power and 
agency in markets.  
By contrast, there are physical market places where direct, face-to-face 
relations take place between market participants. These include flea markets where 
second-hand objects extracted from the garbage are exchanged and local private and 
public auctions where large amounts of waste paper and scrap metal are sold to 
traders who offer bids. As will be explained, in the former, the final price is the result 
of a negotiation between buyers and sellers; in the latter the final price is the result of 
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bids offered, which depends on cooperation and competition between participating 
traders. Since flea markets and auctions give more autonomy to market participants 
to shape the price formation process, fairness is experienced more as the effect of an 
individuals’ actions, rather than something distorted by global exchange or state 
intervention. 
It would be misleading to reduce the first type of market solely to the realm 
of the impersonal and abstract, and the second to the realm of the personal and 
concrete. This distinction is valid as long as one takes into account the experience of 
market actors and the process of price formation. Yet, when attention is paid to the 
range of relations between individuals, who interact in so-called impersonal market, 
we note that there are many dimensions to this market practice which also involves 
personal relations, moral obligations, trust and gift exchange. These relations assume 
a number of functions: helping to cope with market uncertainties, establishing long-
term relationships for the sustainability of the business, asserting authority in the 
market community (Buğra, 1998; Lapavitsas, 2004; Elyachar, 2005). Sayer (2004) and 
Carrier (2018) suggest that these relations should not be thought of as “externally” 
imposed upon market practices. As soon as individuals enter economic relations, 
they also enter a set of moral obligations and social relationships; in fact “the 
production and circulation of things takes place in various activities through which 
people are related” (Carrier, 2018, p. 28). That is why, although the ontological 
reduction of the market to a pure commodity exchange between alienated and profit-
maximising individuals, as defended by neoclassical economics, is refuted, the 
substantivist model of the market as embedded in social relations and institutions 
has to be qualified. Economic and social relations are not two separate spheres, 
wherein the latter sustains the former. Similarly, Barbara Harriss-White (2014) argues 
that markets are themselves “political and social constructs whose performance is 
affected and changed by whose performance is affected and continually changed by 
relations of authority that are established outside the economy and act both inside 
and outside it.” 
There is extensive literature on the constitutive role of kinship, trust, gifts and 
moral relations in markets; what is less debated is the fragile and ambivalent nature 
of these relations. Yet, deception may be as common as trust; there is no guarantee 
that moral obligations will last or that their violation can not be compensated. In the 
Turkish recycling market, whereas deception, guile, opportunism are present even 
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among recycling traders from the same kin groups; trust, promises and informal 
agreements may often be broken, which has an influence on economic relations and 
the price of recyclable commodities. As studies suggest, the boundaries between the 
moral and immoral become blurred when rule-breaking is considered to show 
resourcefulness and astuteness in order to survive, or achieve success in the market 
(see Gerschlanger, 2001; Browne, 2009). In the Turkish recycling market, whether 
deceptive behaviour is positively associated with a survival imperative or clever 
trading, or negatively associated with unacceptable, immoral acts which harm 
others, cannot be determined in advance, but changes according to context. 
After introducing the main features of waste management regulations and 
the actors in the recycling industry, the article describes the means through which 
the state influences prices (direct violence, implicit or explicit support of certain 
companies over others, and trading restrictions) and how market actors react to these 
policies. It further investigates the effect of global exchanges on local actors. In these 
cases price determinants are experienced as exogeneous factors which are difficult, if 
not impossible, to alter. Next, the article focusses on local auctions, secondary 
markets and one-to-one relations between economic actors in order to reveal how 
gift, trust, envy and deception regulate their behaviour and influence local prices. In 
these cases price has additional determinants, stemming from local actors’ own 
actions, interventions and interactions. Thus, moral evaluations about the market 
become more ambigious than those made vis-a-vis the state and global exchange. 
The paper concludes with insights into the contested, context-specific nature of both 
price formation and perceptions of fairness in the recycling market. 
The findings are based on data collected during ethnographic fieldwork, 
which took place between May and October 2007, in December 2007 and June to 
October 2008. A revisit was made in the summer of 2009. Archival research covers 
the period from 2007 to 2014. Some key informants were re-interviewed and data 
updated during 2014. The research sites include streets and warehouses where 
waste-pickers work, the neighbourhoods in which they live, and the neighbourhood 
where traders’ companies are located.2 
 
REGULATIONS AND ACTORS IN THE TURKISH RECYCLING SECTOR 
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The By-Law on the Control of Waste Packaging has retained the same core 
principles, despite several amendments (in 2007, 2011 and 2017), since 2004. 3  
Regulations define all legal entities producing waste as “waste producers”, and 
assign responsibility to them for officially declaring, sorting and managing their 
waste before collection by private providers. The law sets the criteria (physical size, 
category of employees, type of equipment) that recycling facilities must meet in 
order to be granted environmental licenses, which are allocated by the Ministry of 
Environment and Urbanization (Çevre ve Şehircilik Bakanlığı). Two of these licenses 
are pertinent to this paper: the license for collecting and sorting waste facilities (the 
TAT license) and the license for recycling waste facilities (the GDT license). TAT 
license holders sign contracts with municipal authorities in specific jurisdictions, and 
have the right to collect, sort, press and sell waste to the GDT license holders. In the 
article I specifically deal with three different sets of actors in the Turkish recycling 
industry. First, GDT licensed paper factories, which buy waste paper from TAT 
licensed companies. They are of interest because they had a major conflict over price. 
Second, scrap metal companies which sell scrap to large metal factories as raw 
materials and must apply for a license to process scrap metal.4 Third, companies 
holding a collecting license for waste paper and plastic.  
Informal waste-pickers constitute a major source of waste supply. Forced 
migration, neoliberal agricultural reforms eliminating subsidies, the privatization of 
agricultural enterprises, as well as poverty and a lack of formal jobs in industry, has 
led many of the rural and urban poor to undertake waste-picking as an essential or 
secondary work since the 1990s. A typical waste-picker has a carrier, which is a 
manual freight trolley made up of two rollers with two handles, to carry the waste he 
or she collects from public and private bins while walking the urban streets during 
eight or nine hour shifts. This waste is then transported to a warehouse. A 
warehouse can be an informal storage space specifically used for waste transactions, 
or a converted ex-auto repair shop, or squatter housing. Although new waste 
management regulations envisaged eliminating informal waste-picking, the lack of 
infrastructural capacity of recycling companies, coupled with the challenges of 
surveillance of public bins by privatized companies employing wage-labour made 
reducing reliance on informal waste-picking difficult. Since waste-picking responded 
to the problem of unemployment, it was not desirable for the government to 
eliminate it. In this article, I use the case of two Kurdish waste-picking communities 
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which became involved in a major conflict with two TAT licensed companies and the 
municipal authorities. The first community came from the city of Hakkari to settle in 
the Türközü neighbourhood of Ankara as a result of forced migration. Waste-pickers 
in this community are labourers who pool their family income and each family unit 
sells the waste on its own account to TAT license holders. The second community 
lives in a deserted industrial neighbourhood called İskitler, where a group of petty 
capitalists came from the town of Siverek, in the city of Urfa and hired warehouses 
and seasonal migrant wage-labour by mobilising their kinship networks. These 
waste-pickers work and live in the warehouse. 
To understand contestations with resopect to price, the role of state 
institutions is crucial. Responsible for designing waste management plans and 
signing contracts with license holders, municipal authorities can use their authority 
to selectively enact the By-Laws in favor of certain recycling companies over others, 
and this has serious implications for conflicts over price. The role of the Ministry of 
Economy (Ekonomi Bakanlığı) should also be underlined, because, as will be 
explained, its capacity to control international trade for recyclable commodities is 
used by GDT license holders as a means to control local waste paper prices.  
 
 
THE STATE, GLOBAL EXCHANGES AND PRICE 
 
This section examines the influence of the state and global markets on the price of 
recyclable commodities in Turkey. More specifically, it investigates the conflict 
between waste-pickers and two large recycling companies mediated by local 
government, and the conflict between collecting license holders and recycling license 
holders mediated by state institutions. In both cases, the perception of actors 
regarding fairness is similar. Against state intervention which favours certain 
companies, for them the just price is the market price. The section also describes how 
market actors in the scrap metal sector perceive the London Metal Exchange as a 
force over which they have little power. 
 
Waste-pickers, Municipal Governments and Just Price 
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On the first day of fieldwork in 2007, my visit to a recycling warehouse with the 
leading organiser of the Waste-Pickers’ Association was interrupted by a telephone 
call, which led to us rushing to hospital to visit a waste-picker who had brain 
concussion after being severely beaten up by municipal police. This was only the 
most recent incident in a series of conflicts between waste-pickers and the municipal 
government. Most wastepickers who worked in the city centre where initial conflicts 
took place, came from a tribal community that had settled in Türközü 
neighbourhood after they were forced to leave their village in Hakkari in 1994. In the 
absence of employment opportunities, fathers and elder sons from approximately 
120 families started collecting waste. They allocated public bins in the city center to 
each family according to a system of customary rights, and stored the waste in the 
warehouses they had built in their neighbourhood. When the municipal police 
attempted to demolish these warehouses waste-pickers responded with collective 
rage by burning their own warehouses. Conflicts escalated when municipal police 
made routine stops of wastepickers, and asked them to sell their waste exclusively 
and at low prices to a new company called ITC. This multinational had leased the 
management of Mamak recycling facilities (as part of Mamak Landfill Waste 
Management Project) for 49 years from the metropolitan municipality, and had 
invested in the building of a giant recycling facility. Waste-pickers preferred to sell 
their waste to other recycling companies offering the current market price. Their 
refusal to comply with demands led the municipal police to confiscate waste-pickers’ 
trolleys and all the waste collected during the day. In order to terminate conflicts, 
waste-pickers secured an informal deal in which they committed to selling part of 
their waste to ITC on certain days of the week. Yet in 2007 they again faced similar 
pressures from Çankaya district municipality, which had signed a contract with a 
recycling company called SIMAT. Conflicts spread to other neighbourhoods, 
especially İskitler, where the metropolitan municipal administration wanted to 
repossess occupied warehouses, due to plans for an urban regeneration project.5  
The Waste-Pickers’ Association changed the form of protests from 
spontaneous outbursts and individual resistance to more organised and publicly 
visible demonstrations, bringing together waste-pickers from Türközü, İskitler and 
other neighbourhoods. In 2009, Çankaya Municipality made an agreement with the 
Waste-Pickers’ Association not to interfere with waste-pickers’ right to work as long 
as they abided by certain rules of conduct.6  
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While defending their right to collect waste from public bins in the street, 
waste-pickers argue that it was the state`s responsibility to create jobs for waste-
pickers, who, if offered better opportunities, would never choose to work with 
garbage. The moral obligation of the state to create jobs for the unemployed and the 
poor resonated with the repertoire of a moral economy. But when the issue is price, 
they do not expect a fair price to be set for the recyclable commodities they sold, or 
for food they bought in the market, as would be the case in the discourse of moral 
economy. Their understanding of fairness adopted the term “fair competition”, as 
expressed in an article published in the waste-pickers` magazine, Katık. This is more 
similar to those Scholastic thinkers who believed that a just price equated to the 
current market price; the price a good fetched in a sale. In their view, price 
fluctuations are normal if the demand for, or supply of a good, changes. Traders, 
according to this, perform a natural duty when they contribute to the exchange of 
goods in society (Monsalve, 2010). Like those Medieval thinkers such as Cantor who 
is concerned about the official estimator appointed to buy provisions for the royal 
household and set the price for goods he purchases (Baldwin, 1959: 70), waste-
pickers think that neither the municipal administration nor private companies have 
the right to set the price of waste.  
This understanding of price differs from Colombian farmers’ discourse as 
depicted by Gudeman and Rivera (1990). For Colombian farmers trade is good as 
long as it establishes a house’s ability to sustain itself, but a deliberately set just price 
or fair trade (which did not always equate to market price) is necessary to maintain 
the house. When asked about the issue of fairness with respect to the actual sale 
price, waste-pickers in Turkey respond that it is legitimate for recycling factories to 
make profit from the waste they buy since they make investments, plan long-term, 
and spend capital. Some, who consider themselves wage-labourers working in their 
brother/relative’s warehouse, anticipate making such investments themselves: 
opening a warehouse, hiring wage-labour, or buying a small van to work in the 
transport business. Their views about price fluctuations reflect their familiarity and 
acceptance of market language. A waste-picker said that prices fell when there was a 
large amount of imported paper (which he observed in Istanbul, while he walked by 
the port areas with large container ships). He thought scrap metal prices went up 
when there was a boom in the construction industry, which he would understand by 
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observing the actual construction activities while walking in the city to collect scrap 
metal.7 
The legitimacy of the market in economic life does not preclude moral duties. 
In Türközü, elder sons submit the money they get from the sale of waste directly to 
their fathers without keeping any for personal expenditure. Reproduction of the 
tribal community is a primary duty. Families collect a considerable amount of money 
for funerals and weddings to support each other. During the summer periods, young 
children from village communities with which Türközü members have kinship ties 
come to work as waste-pickers. They are allocated special spots in the streets to work 
in order to generate income. Customary rights to work over garbage are thus 
extended to close kin. One could argue that Türközü community resembles Merina, 
as depicted by Bloch (1989), for whom exchange relations are important, yet not 
superior to the domestic domain, and morally acceptable as long as they support 
kinship duties. Accordingly, many Türközü families would have expanded their 
businesses, had the municipal government not demolished their warehouses. An 
essential difference between Merina and Türközü, on the other hand, is that for 
Merina it is the eternal ancestors who organise community life rather than Money. 
Thus, individual property has to be alienated before death. In Türközü, families 
make plans to invest in property on behalf of elder sons, especially in real estate in 
affordable areas of the city. In İskitler community, warehouse owners’ moral 
obligations are less strict. They give advance money to waste-pickers whenever they 
asked, for instance in cases of emergency to support a family member. But this does 
not inhibit the explicit purpose of petty capitalist warehouse owners, which is to 
accumulate capital by hiring kin as wage-labourers. 
The political economy of the recycling economy in the warehouses offers at 
least one explanation for why market price is considered to be legitimate by Turkish 
waste-pickers. Although at first glance most waste-pickers appear to have simple 
livelihood strategies, more complex class relations underpin the informal economy of 
recycling. Many waste-pickers are long-term wage-labourers who have worked in 
other segments of the informal labour market.8  They are dependent on work in 
warehouses and factories. This ties them to warehouse owners, who, as petty 
capitalists, are in turn dependent on access to wage-labour. While owners seek to 
expand, significant constraints on accumulation and competition make this possible 
for a very limited number of individuals. For instance, although warehouse owners 
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have less market power than traders, a warehouse owner who hires significant 
wage-labour may increase his supply of recycling materials and with it his or her 
bargaining power, and secure a price increase when traders are aggressively seeking 
to expand their waste supply. This points to the warehouse owners’ capacity to 
intervene in and negotiate the market sphere, rather than being simply a passive 
recipient of a given market price. Consequently, in the informal economy, we see 
that wage laborers, petty capitalists and traders have long been integrated into a 
complex network of relations in the market economy operating out of warehouses 
and recycling factories.  
Even if tribal, kinship and family obligations restrict to different degrees 
where to spend the money earnt for some communities, they do not prohibit or 
consider morally suspicious wage-labour, profit, property or accumulation.9 Hence, 
they question attempts by the state to interfere in the market by favouring certain 
companies, but not the market itself. Waste-pickers know that the market is 
constituted by power relations due to the unequal distribution of ownership and 
control over resources as observed by Marx (1887/1990) and Weber (see Holton and 
Turner, 1989, pp. 180-181), yet, in pragmatic terms, a market with more competition, 
in which they can choose between buyers is preferred over an oligopolistic market in 
which a small group of companies set the price.  
 
Collecting License Holders, Recycling License Holders and Price 
 
Waste-pickers were not the only ones who were furious at the state’s interference in 
the market price. Companies which held a collecting license were not happy that 
waste-pickers were forced to sell to ITC, since they were an important source of 
waste supply. But their frustration had more complex roots. They were also 
discontent with the price at which they sold waste paper to the recycling license 
holders which used their waste paper as a raw material. In their view, the owners of 
these factories colluded to fix waste paper prices and distorted the market price. 
A policy implemented by the Ministry of Economy in 2011 triggered a 
dispute between TAT license holders and paper factories which held a GDT license. 
The incidents which followed it provided strong evidence of collusive behaviour. On 
21 April 2011, The Official Gazette published an official communiqué10 in which the 
Ministry of Economy imposed the condition that waste paper exporters (who were 
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TAT licensees) should secure permission to export from at least three companies that 
used waste paper as an input (which were GDT licensees). For TAT licensees to be 
able to export, these companies should officially declare that they did not need the 
exported waste paper. 
This decision was allegedly due to the lobbying activities of GDT licensee 
paper factories. Why would paper factories promote such a policy? The answer 
should be sought in the political economy of the local and global recycling economy. 
From 2008 to 2010 waste paper prices had fallen, because China had reduced imports 
of waste paper and European companies had attempted to sell their stocks by 
exporting large quantities of waste paper to Turkey. This made imports more price 
attractive. TAT licensed companies, which already had large stocks of waste paper, 
had entered a difficult situation. From 2010 onwards, international prices gradually 
recovered with rising global aggregate demand for waste paper. But local prices 
were still very low due to the alleged collusion between GDT licensee companies. 
Therefore TAT licensed companies found it more profitable to sell to export markets. 
The official communiqué restrained the freedom of trade for TAT license holders by 
making it conditional on the permission of GDT licensed companies which had 
vested interests in this restriction. Whereas the Foundation of the Cellulose and 
Paper Industry (which represented GDT license holders) defended this policy by 
arguing that the export of waste paper was harmful to the local industry, since 
imported waste paper was expensive due to high global demand.11 TAT license 
holders counter-argued that this decision was a deliberate manoeuver by paper 
factories to reduce the price of waste paper in the domestic market.  
The Competition Authority launched an investigation in the same year, after 
an official complaint, to find out whether nine GDT license holders had colluded in 
their common interest and violated Competition Law. After having evaluated 
evidence of meetings and e-mail exchanges which clearly supported the allegation 
that GDT license holders acted together to restrict the exports of TAT license holders, 
on 8 July 2013, the Competition Authority made the decision that the actions of the 
companies were evidence of collusion and thus a violation of Article 4 of the 
Competition Law, yet the implementation of the Communiqué would be legal until 
2014, giving exemption to companies from charges for violation for a period of three 
years. 12  
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In June 2014, a business association called TÜDAM, whose members included 
TAT license holders, publicly announced that exports of waste paper should be 
unconditional; “the prices should be determined according to the rules of the 
economy, not by such interventions. When demand declines in the domestic market, 
we should not be prevented from exporting paper.” (Çardak, 2014). However, export 
restrictions remained. Similar to the defense of market price by waste-pickers against 
state intervention, TAT license holders promoted market rules and market prices 
against unfair state intervention. 
 
 
Scrap Metal Companies, The London Metal Exchange, and Fairness 
 
For companies which specialise in scrap metal, the source of unfairness lies elsewhere. 
The scrap metal market is indexed to the London Metal Exchange (LME). Although at 
the time of fieldwork no scrap metal contracts were traded at the LME, trade in non-
ferrous metals still set prices for the scrap version of these metals. In comparison to 
waste paper where the role of the state and paper factories is significant, LME prices 
are excluded from state intervention and metal companies which buy scrap from 
scrap traders also use the LME price. In that sense nobody seemed to contest the 
validity of the LME price. 
Problems occurred in times of drastic and unpredicted price falls in the global 
market. “We do the real work, the trade, the toil. They do the fictitious trade and they 
are the ones who decide on the price,” a partner in a scrap metal company told me, 
while looking at the screen of the London Metal Exchange website. It was July 2008, 
and after a long period of steadily soaring prices, aluminium prices suddenly 
plummeted, provoking frustration among traders. While keeping his scrap-metal 
stockpiled in the hope that prices would rise, the owner of a scrap metal company 
grumbled, while looking at the LME website on his computer: “look, we have become 
the puppet of a machine.” This tension between a governing machine and its puppet 
was more than metaphorical expression. It referred to a real experience by the traders 
who had little say or power in determining the prices in the global market.  
The owner of a scrap metal company was in a diffucult position because he 
had been conned by a trader who had bought very large volumes of scrap metal and 
had not paid. He had taken credit from the bank but was finding it difficult to make 
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regular payments. Yet, he was still luckier than many other small scrap traders since 
he had inherited a large factory with his brother and was still able to keep aluminium 
in stock.  
A group of small traders and myself were sitting in a circle reflecting on how 
people had been thrilled by the exceptional rise in aluminium prices over a long 
period and not considered the possibility of a sudden fall.  When asked whether they 
could retain aluminium in stock until prices rose again, the owner of a small scrap 
metal shop replied, “we can’t do that”. He went on to compare his situation to large 
wealthy traders: “if I waited, I would die of pain.” Assymmetrical power relations 
between scrap traders created unfairness. Resilience of scrap trading companies in 
response to price volatility depended on their size. Small traders could not get a just 
price because their ability to withhold stock was limited. 
Another trader who had recently invested in a scrap press machine to expand 
his business disagreed with his fellow traders. It was frustrating to witness drastic 
price falls, and he himself was struggling to pay his bank loan. But he believed that 
the LME prices could be predictable as well, if one knew better how the Exchange 
operated, and what factors influeced the price. This was exceptional, though, to many 




SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, MORALITY AND PRICE 
 
In this section, I examine situations in which prices are influenced more directly by 
inter-subjective relations: negotiations, interactions and tensions between individual 
actors. This happens when waste-pickers sell second hand objects in a flea market, 
when traders cooperate or break agreements while making bids in local scrap 
auctions, and when traders share or steal customers from fellow traders. Behaviour 
in these three cases is motivated by positive emotions of paternalism, the desire to 
show generosity, as well as negative emotions of envy and grudge. In contrast to the 
previous examples, where actors have a more unified view of fairness (market price 
provides a fair price unlike state intervention), in these cases what constitutes 
fairness is more ambigious because the actors who interpret the market, its morality 
and fairness, observe how their own actions influence prices.  
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The Flea Market, The Container Market, and Price 
 
Although waste-pickers are integrated into the formal recycling market via their 
informal activities and defend an average market price, this market price fluctuates 
and sometimes falls drastically. In this context, waste-pickers do not use the language 
of moral economy; they respond by various economic strategies from within the 
recycling market. Samson (2017) explains how reclaimers in a Soweto garbage dump 
use various strategies to cope with falling prices, but not collective struggle to 
negotiate with buyers for higher prices 14 ; they sell assets, take on debt, reduce 
expenditure, intensify labour, diversify the recylables they collect, and sell in informal 
secondary markets instead of the collapsing formal recycling market. Diversification 
of or alternation between various recyclables when economic crisis hits the price of 
recyclable commodities are also strategies in Millar’s (2015) study of a Brazilian 
garbage dump. Similarly, in Turkey, waste-pickers are influenced by price to stop 
collecting some types of recyclable goods and collect others instead, they increase 
their working hours, and they sell objects in the informal flea market to supplement 
their income. Migrant pickers may also choose to do construction or agricultural 
work, depending on the season. 
The flea market, which offers a supplementary income to waste-pickers is 
different from the recycling market where waste paper, plastic and metal are 
homogeneised into average market prices. Price tags in the flea market are multiple, 
heteregenous and open to negotiation. In contrast to the secondary market in Cali, 
Colombia where waste-pickers sold cutlery, jewellery, shoes and clothes to second-
hand dealers (Birkbeck, 1978: 1174), waste-pickers turn into second-hand dealers 
themselves. Poorly furnished, the flea market does not have any of the stalls one 
usually sees in typical local markets for grocery and clothing. Second-hand clothes, 
boks, and an assortment of bizarre-looking objects found by waste-pickers in the 
garbage are displayed on large old rags on the floor. Waste-pickers do not know 
which of the objects they find in the garbage are worth selling and will attract 
customers. Interaction with the bazaar visitors is a learning curve for them to 
understand which objects attract customers. Once visitors show interest in a specific 
product, for instance printer ink boxes, waste-pickers become more attentive in 
searching them out in the garbage. Waste-pickers then get regular customers who 
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knew that they can find what they are looking for at their stall. In line with the 
argument that things move between different states in their long and complex 
biography (Araujo, 2007), the life of objects which are homogeneised by 
commodification is now “appropriated by consumers, revivified and individuated 
(Sherry, 1990, p. 196) in the flea market. 
There is no formal market price in the bazaar; there are various prices which 
change, depending on the unique relationship between visitors and sellers. The initial 
price is not the actual sale price, but it sets the terms for bargaining. In contrast to 
recyclable commodities sold to factories, waste-pickers have some power over this 
negotiated price, but so do the customers. If there is more than one person selling the 
same object, a common estimation can be made to secure a fair deal by comparing 
prices, and it is legitimate for the buyer to offer this comparison in order to reduce a 
price, as long as they are willing to spend enough time in the bazaar to gain market 
information. A fair market price would be that negotiated in each transaction between 
the buyer and the seller.  
There remains one final market in which waste-pickers operate, the so-called 
container market. I owe my first encounter with the container market to a joke made 
by young waste-pickers while I was spending time at one of the warehouses in İskitler. 
Eyüp, whom I had accompanied on his waste-collection rounds, was wearing a nice 
white shirt and a silver-coloured necklace. I complimented him on the necklace, 
knowing that waste-pickers felt ashamed of their dirty work clothes and had little 
opportunity to wear clean, nice-looking clothes except on a Sunday trip to the city 
centre. Eyüp’s cousins and brothers laughed: “He got it from the container market.”15 
I did not understand, and thought there was a market called Container, which made 
them laugh even more. I later figured out that when waste-pickers found accessories, 
clothes, and other objects in the garbage which they could use for themselves, they 
said that they got it from the container market. All containers holding garbage in the 
city constitute a kind of ‘shop’, which offer free objects to those who take time to 
search for them. The container market is based on a diversity of products rather than 
homogeneity; it relies on the value waste-pickers attach to them. Since waste-pickers 
have limited income to spend, the container market enables waste-pickers to have 
access to goods for free.  
Finding beautiful objects imply labour and care in waste-pickers’ work and 
they show pride in offering these objects as gifts. A young waste-picker, who 
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remained silent during a long period of my fieldwork and refused to talk, touched my 
shoulders gently one day and put a red necklace into my hands. The owner of a 
warehouse relying on family labour, who found me eager to listen to his thougths on 
life and politics, gave me a small decorative teapot made of copper that he had 
carefully separated and cleaned from among other objects. Such gifts are signs of 
being accepted into the waste-picking community. When I appreciated them, I 
acknowledged the value people attached to me. When working in the garbage is not a 
matter of pride, but shame, the source of gifts is hidden from recipients. Objects still 
do not have a price tag, but are presumed to have been paid for. A father of three 
children who came to work in Ankara bought colorful wrapping paper to prepare gift 
packages for the toys he had collected from the garbage and washed. He would soon 
go home to another city for the Eid holiday and wanted his children to be happy. 
Gifts are not random remnants from the garbage. Among all the different 
objects waste-pickers come across, specific things are selected, cleaned and prepared 
as presents for individuals they care about. Gifts enable waste-pickers to show that 
despite their poverty they can still control and use resources (the garbage) to exhibit 
emotions such as gratitude to visitors or fatherly affection for children. Their emotions 
of friendship and fatherhood are thus mediated by gifts generated from their work in 
the garbage. 
 
From Gift Exchange to Envy and Deception 
 
In the trading zone where my scrap trader informants are located, I expected 
kinship, trust and gifts to sustain market relations in line with existing ethnographic 
and historical literature. Longstanding and corporate relations were key to the 
creation of the American electricity industry (Granovetter and McGuire, 2002), 
political allegiances and ethnic identities were central to the formation of London 
Stock market (Carruthers, 1994, p. 16), senior traders’ attempts to coerce, cajole and 
plead with other traders allowed the expansion of financial instruments at the 
Chicago Board of Trade (McKenzie, 2006, p. 155), and family ties and kinship 
underpinned the development of local markets in India (Harriss-White, 2005). In fact, 
in the initial stages of their business, traders who had kinship connections had built a 
construction cooperative. By benefitting from bank credit and sharing administrative 
costs, these traders could build and sustain their recycling facilities.   
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 Many of the economic relations are mediated by kinship, but even when this is 
not the case, for example when new companies arrive, relationships take on the 
affective and gifting form associated with kinship. I was sitting in the office of Vahit, 
the owner of a waste paper company, when a trader walked in to discuss a financial 
problem. The deadline for the next instalment for a new house he had bought was 
approaching and he found himself in unexpected financial distress. What Vahit 
offered to his fellow trader was not a cash loan, but a profitable contract with a 
customer whose waste paper he could convert into cash. Vahit’s business was going 
well in those days and he did not need to buy waste paper from this customer. His 
fellow trader could buy and sell the waste paper and pay his mortgage instalment 
with the profit. 
 Customer sharing is not uncommon among neighbouring traders in such 
industrial areas. Elyachar (2005, pp. 154-155) talks about the frequency of customer 
sharing as standard practice among workshop masters in Cairo. Careful track of 
those exchanges was kept, and the expectation that such behaviour would be 
reciprocated shows calculation and a profit motive. Sharing with commission, which 
occurred when, for example, a blacksmith who already had enough work sent a 
customer to another, was closest to classic market exchange, whereas an exchange 
without commission could be considered as a combination of gift and market 
exchange. As Elyachar argues, in contemporary markets differentiating gifts from 
self-interest is misplaced since they are very much intertwined. 
 Gifts may embody a desire to reinforce one’s own authority and prestige. 
Mahmut, the owner of a waste-plastic company, took on the representative of a new 
investor as his protégé. The new company, whose original operations were in the 
south of Turkey, had recently invested in recycling after calculating that profitability 
in the sector was increasing. The new company appointed a young officer called 
Ferhat, who was responsible for finding waste sellers from several warehouses 
throughout Ankara. Mahmut liked this young man and introduced him to people in 
his networks and shared market information with him. Such favours were a sign of 
Mahmut’s authority in the trading community, introducing a dimension Mauss 
(1924/1990, p. 95) attributed to the gift relation: “to give is to show one’s superiority, 
to be more, to be higher in the rank, magister”, or what Sahlins (1972: 208) called 
“calculated generosity”.  
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 Ethnographic observations often illuminate most when they reveal contradictory 
behaviour by the same subject in different contexts. Mahmut refused to show Recai 
the paternalistic attitude he had shown to Ferhat. Recai had recently opened a new 
plastic recycling facility despite very limited capital, and he struggled to pay traders 
who sold him their plastic. While I sat in Recai’s office, he lied on the phone to a 
trader who had sent a large amount of plastic to his factory. “The driver is on his 
way, you will get your money soon”, he said, but as he spoke, the company driver 
was sitting in front of me, waiting for his payment. “In this business, you have to lie. 
I mean, I have to lie. Look at this.” He showed me unpaid invoices and explained he 
lacked cash to pay them. According to Mahmut, Recai did not have the capacity to 
compete. “I offered to buy Recai’s plastic in cash, his whole business is just one day’s 
trade for me, you know, but he refused… You have to lean your back against 
someone”, said Mahmut.  
 Vahit, who as we saw was generous in sharing his customer with a fellow trader, 
was criticised by other traders for offering exceptionally high prices and adopting 
strategies to steal other traders’ regular customers. “I do not understand how he is 
able to make money when he sells above the market price”, said İrfan, the owner of a 
waste paper company. “He also offered 170,000 Turkish lira to a printing company I 
worked with for years in order to regularly buy their waste paper”, he added with a 
frustrated expression. İrfan explained that in the past, since there was a limited 
number of recycling companies, he was able to convince others to fix a sale price to 
mitigate risks of competition. Cooperation seemed to be in the best interests of all. 
The globalisation of the recycling industry, changing waste management regulations, 
and the entry of new market players made it difficult to maintain such cooperative 
behaviour.  
 If traders’ behavioural repertoires shifted across the continuum between gift 
exchange and utility maximisation, one could argue that they selectively used this 
repertoire by investing in gifts for future personal benefit, offering gifts in exchange 
for prestige and authority, or prioritising personal gain at the expense of others’ 
losses. The latter was especially dangerous for traders, because in its extreme form it 
destabilised the price range traders were prepared to pay for waste. More often, 
however, price differences offered by factories were much smaller since they could 
not afford to pay high prices or raise the market price, but these differences still 
affected decisions on whom to sell to. Warehouse owners might even change their 
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long-term buyers due to these differences. “You would not believe how with very 
small price increases we can get people on our side.” said Ferhat while talking about 
his trading strategies. “But you should also know how to speak to different people, 
even your way of smoking and talking should change depending on the person you 
talk to.” Orhan, a warehouse owner confirmed his decision to shift to Ferhat’s 
company: “he (Ferhat) has a sweet tongue.” 
 Some practices do not easily fit within this utility/gift continuum, and this has, in 
turn, implications for price and the competitiveness of individual traders. The first of 
these practices is related to Scrap Auctions. Auctions can be organised by private and 
public institutions (including Ministries and provincial administrations) and they are 
advertised in newspapers. There may be, for instance, a waste paper auction by a 
public institution to liquidate their stock of unused paper products. Another example 
is the demolition of a public prison, which generates substantial quantities of scrap 
metal.  
 Although I did not have a chance to visit an Auction myself (despite my repeated 
requests to be taken), stories told about Scrap Auctions corroborate a pattern. In 
certain auctions, some individuals deliberately raise bids to increase competition and 
prices. This is the case with open auctions. More interestingly, is the case of a trader 
who is a close relative of an eager bidder raising the price deliberately, sometimes 
above the average sale price, just to make sure that the latter does not win. By 
offering a very high price a bidder might even undermine his own economic 
interests. The reason behind such behaviour is explained as a “grudge” emerging 
from a dispute, or “envy”. It is equally possible for traders to make a deal prior to an 
auction, and the winner share the scrap with the trader(s) he has made the pact with. 
In such cases, post-auction disputes might emerge about terms and conditions of 
respective shares. The results of cooperation or tensions are therefore unpredictable. 
Previous agreements may well turn into aggressive competition and deceit, or vice 
versa.16 This makes the auction sale price unpredictable, as it can change according 
to the number of participants, and depend on the fluid and inter-personal relations 
between traders. 
 Envy and grudges motivate other forms of action. In one case, two companies 
allegedly filed official compaints to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization 
about a group of recycling companies violating their license obligations, including 
the buying of waste from informal waste-pickers, although this was common 
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practice. Investigations led to significant fines for the companies and had an effect on 
their competitiveness. Such behaviour resonates with Castellanos’ (2012) case study 
from Colombia, where envy is found to be a major emotion regulating the symbolic 
universe of local pottery makers, who filed several complaints and even lawsuits to 
public authorities regarding misconduct or unpaid debts. 
 In the literature on the evil eye, envy is considered to emerge from a context in 
which goods are limited and one’s wealth is at the expense of another’s loss, which 
leads to competitive, evasive, or concealing behaviour (Foster, 1972). Fear of the evil 
eye (Gosh, 1983; Gershman, 2014) reflects destructive fear of envy, discourages 
wealth accumulation and regulates social behaviour. In contemporary markets, the 
case of Egyptian workshop masters (Elyachar, 2005) or Mongolian miners (High, 
2008) indicate continuities between such fear and its economic implications. Do 
similar negative feedback mechanisms regulate traders’ behaviour?  
 Wealth accumulation is not discouraged in the Turkish case. On the contrary, it is 
praised. Yet, traders have views about which emotion and behaviour is morally 
acceptable or not, while making profits. “If one thinks only about his own profit, he 
cannot make profit himself in the end”, said Ercan, the owner of a plastic recycling 
factory, referring to what he considered greedy traders. Soon after that, he took a 
self-critical stance: “… partners in X company had fought and were about to dissolve 
their partnership. Due to the tension and dispute, no one was at the factory. Their 
customers did not know and had unloaded all the plastic and needed to get their 
money. We saw that and we bought the waste cheaply... Although it was worth 
more. What we did was sort of... opportunism.” 
 A minor intermediary dealer was famous for stealing regular yet small amounts 
of money from the people he worked with. This was considered as legitimate 
because he also made his bosses a lot of money, using his social skills, social 
networks, and ability to enact various performances in order to make good deals for 
waste supply. “You have to ignore petty cheating if someone earns you money”, said 
a warehouse owner while talking about this dealer. In another case, a son had stolen 
all the scrap metal from his father’s yard late one evening. According to the traders 
who knew that the person responsible was the son, what he did was wrong, but he 
had no choice because the father had been stingy and unfair, not giving his son any 
money although he worked hard for his father. However, if a new trader is thought 
to make his profit by trading stolen scrap, this is considered as creating unfair 
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competition and tarnishing the reputation of all traders. Whether deceptive 
behaviour can be accepted or condemned is not determined in advance, but changes 
according to context.17  
 Traders do not only respond to external pressures such as price movements, 
changing supply and demand or state regulations, but each other’s behaviours, 
everyday interactions and associated emotions, which has, in turn, important 
economic (and not always rational in terms of self-interest) consequences. Kinship 
and personal relations between traders may turn from positive resources for 
reciprocity into domains to express envy, grudge or revenge.18 This also makes trust 
significant, and all traders I talked to emphasised this as the main regulative 
principle of trade, yet its significance seems to come more from its scarcity and 




Unlike historical and contemporary struggles claiming a just price against 
unregulated or free markets, contestations over price in the Turkish recycling sector 
did not generate claims for justice against the abstract market price. One reason for 
this is that market forces are not perceived to threaten the survival of those who do 
not have market power, since waste-pickers and warehouse owners have been 
integrated into the informal market economies via various shifting occupations 
(construction, agriculture, textile) before and alongside waste-picking. 
 Experience of fairness with respect to price changes according to the type of 
market in which one operates and to determinants of price. In the globalised market 
for waste paper, plastic and scrap metal, the average sale price of recyclable 
commodities is experienced as an abstract force, yet the source of the problem lies in 
companies which want to increase their market share. It is state instruments (by-
laws, official communiqués or physical violence) which materialise vested interests. 
These regulations are perceived as infringing upon the market participants’ right to 
freely choose their buyers. Thus, fair competition means withdrawal of the state from 
the market sphere, and the just price is the actual sale price. 
 In the case of scrap metal, the London Metal Exchange is blamed when prices fall 
drastically and scrap traders incur losses. During times of stability, the LME prices 
are accepted as more legitimate compared to the situation in waste paper, where 
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paper companies and the state use their power to control the market price. But in 
times of crisis, traders feel it unfair that they do all the hard work and a group of 
people in the Exchange decide how much the efforts of traders are worth. The extent 
to which actors cope with these market imbalances depends on their relative 
bargaining power; large traders can keep scrap metal in their stocks until prices rise 
again whereas smaller ones cannot.  
 When price is the by-product of or is influenced by more direct interactions than 
global exchange and the state, the experience of fairness in relation to price has its 
own dynamic; in the flea market, price is negotiated between buyers and sellers. 
Auction sale prices change depending on the number and motivation of participants, 
and whether there is cooperation or fierce competition between traders. It may be 
then more appropriate to talk about “multiple markets” 20   whose shape, and 
configurations of power between actors, influence the final price and assessments 
about justice. 
 Both waste-pickers and traders have their own conceptualisation of what is moral 
or immoral behaviour in the market. It is immoral for the state to “play with the 
bread” of waste-pickers and it was the state’s moral duty to “find jobs” for them if 
informal waste-picking is to be prohibited. But hiring wage-labour, making profit, 
and expanding one’s business are not immoral. For traders, buying cheaply in the 
market is acceptable as clever opportunism, but thinking solely of one’s own profit  
and being too greedy can be dangerous. One should give money or tolerate small 
illicit gains. It is important to help those who recognise one’s authority, but 
legitimate to ignore those who do not. It is also difficult to make clear cut judgements 
about traders’ behaviour, since what may appear to be wrong and immoral may be 
justified from a different angle or when circumstances change. The same actors may 
be involved in contradictory actions in the market; pursuing competitive ambitions, 
perhaps motivated by envy on the one hand, yet displaying generosity and fulfilling 
moral obligations on the other.  
 These insights indicate the contested and contingent nature of market price and 
fairness, depending on the shifting strategies of actors, their relative bargaining 
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1 Until 2004, before the privatisation of the paper industry and closing down of state conomic 
enterprises and factories in the cellulose sector, the state maintained a regulative role in 
controllinging domestic market prices for paper and waste paper. 
2 The names of all informants have been changed for anonymity. 
3 Official Gazette 27th December, 2017, no 30283. 
4 By-Law on The Recycling of Certain non-Hazardous Wastes, Official Gazette, 17th June, 
2011, no 27967. 
5  The project was only implemented in Autumn 2017, and several warehouses were 
demolished by the municipal government. 
6 The Waste-Pickers’ Association in Turkey carried out a public advocacy campaign to defend 
the right to work without being subject to violence in the streets, and the same rights to 
health and legal recognition that waste-pickers in South America have, as recognized and 
authorised service providers. For Colombia, see Ruiz-Restrepo and Barnes (2010), and for 
Brazil, see Dias (2012). Today waste-pickers in Turkey continue to work as informal wage-
labourers. For a more detailed class analysis of waste-pickers in the recycling market see 
Dinler (2016). 
7 Katherine Millar’s (2015) study of Brazilian garbage dump workers suggests that workers 
have similar reflections on the reasons behind price fluctuations. 
8 This situation is different from Indian waste-pickers examined by Kaveri Gill (2007). In 
Delhi, Gill finds more binding and long-term exchange relations between dealers and waste-
pickers who are subject to social stigma, preventing horizontal and vertical mobility.  
9 This general legitimation is challenged by waste-picker organisers who point to structural 
inequalities in society and claim for the elimination of capitalist conditions which reproduce 
them as wage-labourers. This more radical discourse is used during times of protest by waste 
pickers while defending their right to work in the streets.  
10 Official Communiqué on the Amendment of Official Communiqué 2006/7 on the goods 
whose export is conditional upon registration, Official Gazette, no 27912, date: 21.04.2011. 
11 Local paper producers complained that cheap and low quality imported paper (due to 
dumping prices as a result of the WTO requirements) had a negative effect on the price of local 
paper. Dünya, “Damping ve İthal Kağıttaki Artış Yerli Üretimi Zora Soktu”, 14th January, 2014  
12 See Competition Board Decision, number: 13-42/538-238; date: 8th July 2013. The rule 
about the conditional export of waste paper was only removed on 1 June 2018 (Official 
Gazette 34308). 
13 The situation is different for large Turkish metal factories some of whom use the LME to 
hedge their risks.  
14 At the dump there are hierarchies between reclaimers from different nationalities who are 
allocated different shifts. 
15 In Turkish the term ‘market’ refers to a shop or grocery store, a smaller version of a 
supermarket. 
16 As Mauss (1924/1990: 104-105) argues, people who had no choice but to cooperate, and 
giving in tribal life could suddenly switch from battle to festival and vice versa.  
17 See Browne (2004) for a case study from Martinique where many informal/illict/illegal 
economic activities were considered to be the manifestation of cleverness, astuteness and 
achievement, a discourse emerging from a historically specific cultural universe shared by 
Martinique people from different class backgrounds.  
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18 In his case study of wealthy industrialists who come from the same natal town in Kayseri, 
Cengiz (2013) finds that, contrary to his own expectations that kinship bonds and solidarity 
networks would support business relations, industrialists did not exchange help or support 
to start, expand and maintain their business. On the contrary, they pointed to “envy” as a 
driving force behind individual success. Envy has a positive connotation in this context, 
because by “envying” the rival relative, one is motivated to set up business and/or work 
harder and with more ambition. 
19 As Yükseker (2003) indicates for the case of cross-border informal traders in Istanbul, trust 
relations could not be taken for granted to build the market; they could be broken and had to 
be rebuilt.  
20 I borrow the term from Zelizer (1988) who suggests making an empirical examination of a 
variety of historically changing markets associated with different values, behaviours and 
beliefs underpinned by structural factors. She investigates shifts between gift-type exchanges 
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